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EXPLANATORY  NOTE  . 
Subject  :.~·  : c;mmunjcatl'on  of  the  Com!T)i-ssion 'to  the :CounciL 
regarding  the position, of the  Community  as ·to·  an  ev.entua.L .:inter--
nat iona t  agreem~nt on  ·coPPER~~  .  ~ .  .  ~  . 
.  -~ 
In'  view  of  the  third  UNCTA·o  pr-eparatory,  meeting  on  copper  in. 
january  197_8  (S/1955/??)~.the Commission  presented  a'communicat.ion  to  the· 
Council  r~garding ·"guidelines  for  ~a  Community  position  w'ith  regard  to  the  -· 
preparatory· wo.rk :of UNCTAD  for ·a·n  internationa·L  :Conferen~e on·  Copper".· 
.·  Since  that· date  ahd 'on  the~cc~sion of  e~ch  on~ of  the  s~ries of 
UNCTAD  meetings  on. copper.,  .the  'Co~mission  ~egularly: iiiforme.d"the ·Group' 
-'.'Commo'dities"·. of  the  Co.unc1L'of.  its  v~ews on the- very  marked  by  now·-
_evolution of  t'he  situati.on  in. the  copp,er  market  and  sector:  Accordi-ngly 
.it does  not  consid~r usef-u-L  again to set.out factuaL:data.  Be  .it.sufficit::"'nt, 
to  re.t:9Ll. ·tha·t  rel·afively_ t-ight  suppl-_ies .now  have 'fdll'owed  a:  very .Long  . 
.  period of  surplus •.  '·  · 
.. 
I.·.  On  the other  side ;t is,,recal'led· thai 'after  numerous  and  re~at'iv,ely 
improd~ctive meet'ings,  the· p,reparatory 'work  on copper  notably~  s-et  aside. the 
prospect  to.  limit. one'sel  f.  to  the  creatiqn 6(  a  consultative  body  on  co_pper 
in a  first  stage.  Finally,  a  second. Intergcl\iernmental' Group .of  Experts  on 
Copper  <2'nd  IGEC)  will  meet  in Geneva' fro~ the 2Sth·  of  June  and  the 6th of 
·July  ;  'i:ts  mandate· wilL  be  to  propos'e· a reasoned  selection ·of  measures  · 
·which  could. possibly. form  thebasis of  an'international.agreement  on' copper:. 
A .seventh preparatory'meetin_g  wi.l;l  meet  in  September  1.9-79 ,at  the tatti!st'  · 
"to  appra·ise  t_he  fin_dings·  al:')d  concl~..:~sions of  the -2nd  1~EC ·and  make  appro-
pri~te recommendations .for  the  im~Le~ent~tio~ of  Conferen6e~Resolution 93 
<r\n  with·in  the  calendar .of  the~ Integrated  Programme  for  Commo'dities" •.  ·'  ..  _'  '  '.  :- .  .  •  \  I:_.  .  '  .  .  .. 
As  is  well  known,, the  revised .timetable of -the·  Integrate!;:!  Programme 
.envisages; 'the ·conCLUsion "o.f·  the  preparatory _work  on-copper  ~nd the- ho ldi:ng  ' 
of  ev~ntva  l  negoti.ati ng :conferences  of  i nternat iona l  commodHy  agreements 
· before .the  end  of  1979.  It  ; s  known  as welL  that  the  fifth -UNCTAD  p're·sent ly · 
being  held  in  Manila  will'notably  Look  into  the  ~esults achieved  bY-the·· 
'·  Integrated  Programme  and  into  it's 'continuation'.·  _,.  . •  ·  · 
,  .. 
·.Under  the~e- ci rcwnstimces-this prej ect: of_  a: new  Communi  ~at  i o~ on  ..  . ;  · 
copper  propqs~s the out:L in·e  of· an  agreement  which,- in -our  m.i nd,  should  be- . 
..  capable  o~f  being.accepted--by  the 'developing  producer  countries  without. 
·.  being,'in  contradiction with  the  pri-ncipl-es  of'market  economy'or  involving:· 
-a.n  excessive  burden  fo'r ·the  economy  of the Community.-·  . 
'  .,.  <.  •  ...  ' 
'  . 
I· 
·.\ 
.. 
1.  - -- • ... 
Introduction 
The  Sixth  Preparatory  Meeting  on  Copper  set ·out  the  objectives of 
intergovernmental. cooper-ation  a-nd  also  established  a  lis't  of  the.elements' 
which  might  app-ear  in  an  int'ernational· arrangement  as  we.ll  as  a  non-
. restr-ictive' list of  relevant  aspects  and  implication-s. 
'  - . 
In  the  light  ~f the-above  indicatinns,  the  Sixth-Preparatory·~eeting 
instructed  a  Se-cond  Intergovernmental  Group  of  Experts -on  -Copper  (2nd  -
IGEC)·to  carry  out  a  technical  examination of·a  possible  agre_ement  from-
the point  of  view  of  eff~ctiven!Ss, cost -and  ~dvaAta~es; if the  2nd  IGEC 
is able-to  re_ach  a  -~onclusion.on the  most  appropriate  measures  for 
stabilization, it is also  invit~d t6  gi0e  an  opin~on on  the  arrangements 
'for  implementi~g and  adapting  ~hose  measures~  The  2~d  IGEC  will  meet 
'  . 
from  2~-June to-6 July  ~nd a  Sev~nth  P~epar~tory Meeting  will  be ·held 
"no  Later· than ·September".  :rhis  latter meeting  will  have  the  task  of 
·-evaluating- the  results and  co-nclusions  of  the.- 2nd ·rGEC and  of  formulating 
. -appropriate· re.commendations  with  a  view·to the  -Implementation  of  · 
,-
_Resolution  93<IV)  within-the-timetable .for  the  I!ltegrateel- Programme :for-
Commodities. 
In the  Commission•s  opinibn,  the  ~limate and  tenor  of  the  disc~ssions  .  -
o.f. the  Sixth  Preparatory  Mee-ting  lead  t'o  the -conclusion that  th~ Community 
position  i-n  favour. of  simple  consultations  between .copper  pr.oducers  and 
I  .  . I  . 
consumers,-. or  even  further, ·;r- favour  of  evolutive  international· action 
i~. certain  to  ~eet with ·insurmount~ble ·incomprehension  ~r  eve~  hostilit~ 
. whatever  the  merit ·of. ·its arguments.  It  should  be  recal-led,  moreover~. 
that  at. the  Sixth  Prepa.r·atory  Meeting  the  Communit:Y,  stated its 
.rea9ine'ss t,o  participate in ·a. construc·tive·spi'ri·t  in· a  negotiating 
conf?rence- i_t -there· was  a  m~;~tua.l-L-y  acceptable  basi·s. for ·an  agreemer-~t · . 
:-o·n  coppe.r.a- .. Lastly,- th~  'argument  tha~-- UNC~AD V mi-gh-t. eventually make. 
.· 
l\  : 
·,the ·rapid .convocation, o-f  a:  c-onference  on  copper, more.  plausible ·or  eve~.  · · 
. --.politically inevitable, .cannot,. it seem_~,  be _ruled  out-a ....  2 
.  .  ~ 
Gi'ven  the  t~·meta.bte-·co~straints,_the-c"ommission therefore  feels 
that  ~h~ Cdm~unity sh6uld  p~epare  it~elf now  for  any  eventuali~y and  ·  -· 
.  .  I  .  - .  .  .  I·~.  .,  •  •  • 
should. lo.ok  beyond ·the.  work  of  the  2nd  IGEC  in.July.  It  s~ould t.herefore  · 
. re~ch agreement' on ·what 'it  could  ~egar.d :as a'  plausiol~ formulq .for an  . 
in it;  a l  ~gr~eme~~  on._cop~i/r  ,_  that~ ; s. a  formu~a  t~·a·t. could. wi ~-the _support .·: 
::-·,of the  deVeloping  ·country· producers-wlii  Le·  at  the. same. timer purs\.d ng··as 
1  •  "'·  •  '~  1  ,  '  I  ,  ,  .  •  ·~  ,  '  '  ,  '  ,  ,  _.-
'•  .  . 
well  as  possib_.Le  the.;i~teres.ts of  _the  Communityo  .'· 
.·. 
To  obtain  the  support  o.f  the de-veloping  cou'Qtry. produ'cers,  ft 
app~ar~ to  the·  C~m~i ssi  ~n tb ,be.· un·~voi  dab-Ly  nec~isa~Y.  to  work. from  the_-· 
outset along'  t~e ·unes  of)~- st~bilization agre~ment  w.it.h  buffer'stoc~:ing, 
'I  ... 
supp9rted  as  a  Last  resort,  by  expo_r::t  ·.'c;:ontrol.  · Iri  coun-terpart  to these 
'  -~  .  '  ' 
econom·; c.  e Lement.s;. the  agreement,  which'  would  have  apprppri ate  resource_s 
at  its ·dispo·sal,  wquld  oblige  the  pa_rties  to  hold-consultations  on  the· 
- '  .  . . \  .  .  ~  .  .  .  .  . 
c.l.os.est  p.ossi b Le  bas·i. s  anq  to  ensur¢  the· necessar:-y  t  ranspar.~ncy.  of  the, 
cop~e~ sectbr at  world  L~ve~. 
It  is in this  Light that  the  Commi~sion:outlines here  its  refl~xions 
on  the  headings  in· the  ll)a,ndate  given _to. t_he .. 2nd  ..  IGE~  ~ .- ..  '  . 
.  , 
Forth~  sa~~~of  ~La~itr, the-headings  of  the  mandate  will be.dealt-
with' as  follo'ws: 
·1.,  Mark_e~. stabilization 'and'-pri-ce_ range; 
·2.  Buffer s'tocking .and  p~iv'ate or- strategjc. stocks';  .  .  , 
3. ,Practical  arr~:in_gemerit.s. (lnd 'volume. of_  the  buf-f~_r. stock;·_·.-
" .. 
. 4 •.  Regula·t ion. of  exports , (and/  or:.__ p roduct:'1 on.); 
.  '  '  .  ~ 
'  /  5.  Particular  p·roblems  of  th.e  dev-eloping  country  produ'cers;-
'  .  .  .  .  - '  . 
6.  Obj-ective  of,  and  arrangements  f_or,_  intern_ationa:t.:  c_orisuLtati_on~, 
...  ··institutional as·pects;,. 
7  ~  Fi nanci'a.l  req.ui r·ements; · 
l  '  . 
8.  Financing. arrangements. 
~ .  '  ... 
It wi  l.l  be  assumed  that  the  da.ta  co'ncerni ng  the  characteri st·i cs 
of  the  coppe·r  sector, an~- its present  si-tuation are '.known.-.  The 
·commi'ssion  feels: it _is' not  n·ecessary  to  -r~·turn to  these  aspects  since 
it  r~cent:_Ly  reporte:d  on-th·e~ _i-ri  .c:letai l- ~~d t:here  have -been  no  nptable' 
subseq~en~  chaAges~ 
.  : 
-., 
·.·.':!I  .• I. ; 
·.·t  ...  ....  :: 
.  .._· 
·' ., 
'•  .. 
3 
1.  Market  stability and  price  range 
The  indicators ·fl.!rni shed  by  prices  preva:i ling  on  the  futures, 
markets,  and  notabty  the  LME,_  'are  not  conteste'd  in practice.  In an'y 
event,  the  C6mmunity  waul~ refuse  to  interfere  with  their  fu~~tioni~g.  - .  ,;  '  '-,.  . 
For  this  r~~son;  ·fo~  the·c~mm~nity, market  siabiliz~tion  ~6uld consist 
.o1  the  maintenan~e of. the· price  within~  c~rtaih  r~nge around  the  long-
term  frend  by  defendi~g a  minimum  pric~ and  a  maximum  price.  It  is 
true  that  the de0eloping  ~ouhtry producers  w9uld  prefer  th~  de~ence of  a 
minimum  price· fixed  on  the basis  of  copper  production  c'osts,  but  this 
idea_  is-complicated  by  the  divers-ity of the  Level  arid  stru~ture of  those 
·- -
~6sts and  .. would  the~efore:be difficult  to.apply.  ·Stabilization~  i~  ~he 
manner  'in  which  it  can  be  envisaged,  makes  it necessary  in_  principle: 
t-o  hav,e  ·a  satist'actory evaluation of the price corresponding .at  a  given 
moment  to the  l'ong-:-term  trend;. 
- to  determine  the quantitative  relationship that  exists  between  th~ 
I 
Midth  of  the  stabiliz~t-ion range  and  the  volume  of  intervention 
.  .  .  . 
resources,  i.e.  stocking  resources,  t~ai-~re necessary. 
It  must  h~  recognized that  the,  hitherto jnadequate;  qua-lity  of-
.  .  .  ... 
the  analysis-of the  phenomena  obser\/ed-on  the  market- makes  any  such 
evaLuations  very .approximate.  Quantitative  L·y  satisfactory evaluations 
therefore  s~em to  be  a  prior.~onditi~n for  stabilization. 
It is nevertheless  possible to avoid this prior condition  - which 
would_ otherwise, prevent ,rna rket- stabilization action  in  the  pre·sent -
circumstances  - if: 
~ t~ere is  no  attempt  to  na~row the price  range. excessively; 
..  -.a  ce.rtain  margin_of  em~ri.cism and_  flexibility as  regard,s  the.ma~ag~ment_ 
of  the  stabiljsatioh  resources ts  left  for.~h~ m~naging body  of the: 
agreement. 
It is  certainly desirable· -that  a  poS?Jble agreement  should meet 
·these  two- conditions.  Iri·pariicula.r it ~an be  maintained  th~t t6 
','  +  . 
·reduce  the·  range  below.- 10%  for- example  would  deprive  ttie  market'- of' ·'its· 
i 
.!. 
I. ....  ',, 
4.-· 
:ro·le  and.  accordingly its  sfg~if  .. icance~  In  these  circumst_ances,  one 
. c~nnot  ov'er~mphasi se  the .need  for·:  p·~eci si on  in the  deterrhi natfon  of  the 
ave~a!;!,e  stabilization pr1ce  and  the  projected~olum~ of·stock~··.'_  ... · 
~  ~  . '· 
.·,~·If neverthetess  th-e  fixih'g' of~ price  range  as  a  realistic-. 
stab.i Li~_ati.o~  objective· were' on  examinat-ion .to  appear  a~· excessiv_ely 
delicate matter,  ~hi·s  w:ould  ~no~  necessarily mean  ;;.bando.ning>he  ~dea 
of  action  to achieve.stabiL·1zation.  -In.order to  avo-id'the  well..,.known 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .  .  ) 
dra~batks ·of  ~  badly  chosen  br .excessively wide  pri~e range,  an 
examina\ion  6ou-Ld  ~nitiallybe made  o~ the  p.ossi.bi Lity· ~f  buffer' ·st.o~k 
•  •  •  - '  •  •I  ._ •  •  "  • 
op~ration  consisti-~g. in  buying  when  the' mark'et  is' rin  contango. (supply 
9VaiL·abfLity.  sHuatioh(_·-~nd  ,~e=l·~·i~g  Wh~n· the  ma.rket  is\.in. bac~wa_rdati~n· 
.  .  \.  - ,  ,..;;,,.  .  .  '-:, 
(SC;lr'City  s:ituati'on).  Th1s ·simple. ruLe: might  or  mi'ght  hot  be  combined  .·  .  .  ·.·  .....  '+  ·.  . 
·  with  the  fi xi.ng  of' a  very_ wi._l:le  ·safety  range· (eg  - 25%).  The  o_bj ecti've 
.·  . 
. would  in  any .case be  to.  narrow the· range- subsequently ·in· the  Light .o_f 
•  ..-.  j  '  •  •  •  •  •  J.  . 
'  _,  ..  · 
.. 
2~  Buffer  sto·cking  and private.or strategic. stocks. 
.  .  .  .  . 
Th.e  Coinmu~ity  sho~Ld ta_ke. ··note  of  the .fact  that~ with' price 
stabiliiation as  th~· objective,  the  preparaiory  wo~k.~as ~on~tantLy· ·  .  .  /'  .  :  ~  ' 
.·indicated 'buffef· stocking  as  an  essen;ial  ins:trument  of  th,at 
stab  i L  i z at  i·on. · . 
'·, 
.rt·  iS  Clear. that copper. is  par'ticula~Ly suitable ·for. stock~ng-.. and 
- '  . 
. that  between  production· and  consu.mption,  the"' kn9wn  or  estfmated  stocks,. 
of. whatever  nature,  have  -al'w~ys  pla~~d~ an  i.mpott~nt·.  ro~e. in' the: 
relationsh-ip  between  supply  a_nd.demand,  ·; .• ·e ..  in the  fixin'g: of  the  market 
·· .... 
.  ....  ,. 
the ·community· sh-ould· therefore .recognize at  the. o~uts~t- th~t· any  -...  . 
·agreement. on  copper  should utilize 'buffe~·-stocki.ng~, rh+s  being··  sa_id, 
...  •  !  '  •  •  ""'- •  •  .. 
buffer" stocking  pra·cti sed ,on 'a' world scale .does  not  i psp: facto .remove 
'the  pr.obl~ms · Lin·ked  with  ~xi's.~in§  p~,fvat~··arid nadonal  stock-s  but· ~an' 
'·, 
,· 
....  ! 
/'  •·.  .  ·- '  . 
in  fac·t:·  resuLt  1  n :a  riumbe~  :' o(  adcii t i anal.  problems·.·  The·.  Cornmu~ity ·shouJd 
'.  . :.  \.  •  - •• -:  .  ':  •  •  - :  •  •  •  :  - ..r 
pay  particular· attention to the  problef!J_S  that. coul_d  ar,i se·  fr.om  the ·fact . 
. that  inte·rnat_ionaC.stocki-~g~.  b_y  creatlng  an  iLlusion. ~-f !security; . 
• l. 
' . 
.  ·  ....... - ~  .. 5 
.I 
might-induce  private  operators  or  the  members  of  the  agreement  ~o  ~educe 
a~preci~bty the  Level  of  technical  or  strate~~c  stocks~ and,  ~ore 
. generally,  to play  irresponsibly  wi~h their  stocks  for  speculative 
p~rposes or  simply to  cope  with-liquidity problems. 
The  buffe~ stocking  arrangements  will  therefore  need  to  ~hcorporate 
necessary  safety  fea~~res io  avoid  the possibility of  buffer  stocking 
giving  r.i se to secondary effects  wh·i ch  are  worse  than  those  it is·· 
designed  to cou'nteract. 
3. '.Practical  arrangements  and  volume  of  the  buffer  stock 
In  the_ course  of  the  pr_eparatory  work  carried out  to date,  the 
practical  ar~ang~ments for  buffer ·stocking  have  never  been  di~~ussed 
in detail. 
It  should be  obs~rved  ~irst of all  th~t the  p6ssibilities are either 
inte~n~tion~l  financ~ng and  centralised  stock  management  Ctnternati6nal 
buffer  stock)  or  a  coordinated  managefue~t 6f  national  stocks.  This 
second  formula  would  appear at  first  sight  to  h~ve certain advantages, 
notably: 
tha_t  of  not,  in theory,  requi ri'ng  international  fi nanc:i ng; 
th~t  of  L~aving to those  who  run  the  national  ~conomies - who  are  in 
the  P.est  position to  ~ee. how  the.d1fficulties arising  from'the 
interaction of  the-various  type·s.of  stocking  (referred to  above)· 
can  be  avoided.in the  Local  context  -_,the  responsibility for  fulfilling· 
the  buffe~ stock obl  i gati  o!."ts  i ncurrtb~nt  upon th'ei r  country. 
Ho~ever, it also  h~s disadvantages,  notably: 
-.recourse to .internati_onal  financing ·bodies  would  in any  case  be 
inevitable  to  enable  certain  pa~ticipants in the agreement, 
partic~larly.-the developing  ~ountries who  were  experi~ncing financial  - · 
difficulties~ to  honour  thei~ stocking obligations; 
- the  co~rd:inated. management  o.f  national  stocks  i's  necessari·ly  · · 
--cumbersome  and. suc.cess  is. uncertai·n. given· a  market ·as  volatile. as. 
;the  copper.market. 
.!. 
·'··  ...  ·.' .. '  ' 
·  Si~ce-the  disadva~tage~ seem  to  outweigh· th~  advant~~es~· the 
•  I  \  •  - ' 
Communi-ty  should; i.n  the. Commissio~'s .opinion, ·declare  i-tself -in  favour  .  .·  -·  (  .  . 
of :interrlational  finai)cing  and  centralized management  of  the  buffer 
s.tock.  ... 
.  - .  -. 
·,.The  hypersensitivity' of  the  copp·e~ ma·rkets  milita-tes,  at·. Lea~-t  if· 
one  exclu~~s-the  hyp,o.thesi_s·. of  as'p:uc.tura L ·depre.ss.i on _of  m.eta L  _ pri ce_s, 
'  .  .  .  .  '  .  .  .  ..  .  I.  '  .  .•  .  '  .  .  '  • 
ii:l  favour' of  non-excessive  stocking;  1t_  being  under.sto()d  that  the 
.  ~greemt:n~- s'hould·.contain. a  Pr:6v:iSio(l_  w~er~bY, an  i~cre~se .in  these 
resources  could  b~ considered  in  th~_ Light  of th·e. ci rcu·mstances 
pre·vai ling.  Moreover,.· _in  ,view o:f  the  danger. of,  the  effect. of  'iLlusory:., 
''.security~- the' buffer -stocking  mechanism  should' not, be' given  excessively 
'  .  .  .  ·,,  .  .  .  . :  . .  .  .  .  - /  -..  .  . 
.Large  re·sou rces -even· .t()  justify ·abandoning  ~ecourse to  ~ny  ·other  ·_type 
'  ..  .  --
'\  -.... 
of  mea,sure  for  reasons ·of  simplicity or other  reasonso 
- r • 
.-.·· 
·  In  any -ev~nt  and  il')  view of the ann.ual  volume  of' the  int.erna~ional 
< t  rad~, _resources  correspondi·ng. to  500~000 t·onhes  of-. copper_;. or. 
approximately  10%  of.that -an~l;l_al  volume·6r'5·-week's  t-rading  se;em  to be 
app~opr~aie if ~n~ bears  iri  ~i~d: 
·-,  ~  _- - '  ,.J  '  •  • 
that ·quffer  stocking  is_- intended to be  in _addition  to  th'e·· stocking 
·.,aLready  practised  by ·pr·i'vate  and .public  operato_rs· and not· .to  replace-. 
it; -
~  ' 
'  .  .::\  that- S00,000  tohnes  in  S.~ppleme_ntary·  ~tocks 'would  at -Certain  tfme5_  -· ·.  · 
<eg. the  end  of· 1973/beginni ng _of  -1974) ·have  been equivalent  to  tot~'L 
~recorded  wo~Ld' s~pcks; 
·.  ~ 
- -' 
_,.  . \  '  tha.t-'it :is. not' intended that  buffe.r•  stocking  should  be  (he 'mean~ of 
.____ 
absorb.ing  the 1 s'urplu~- in .a· ~onti'nuing. si,tuati'on  or, overproduction;.· 
- that  it is-necessary to  remain.~  within acceptable· financial  commitm~nt  · . 
,•  <  ,,  •  •  •  '  -_.  I  •  _..'  • 
/, 
'  ;-
! 
;  .. 
·limit~~ 
/  .  .  ' 
The  us~ bf-the  res6Jr~es -calls for.a  number  o~·  c~mmen~s.  Firstly, 
during -the -running-i'n 
7pe~:iod  of  an.initiaL.agreem~nt-·on copp,e·r,  it  .. · 
'  •,  '  -~  -..._  '  '  ""'  '•  "'.I  .  I 
.will be necessary to  exami~e--to what  rules  and ,what  spe.cial'f_l_ex~bility. 
(se~  1'~  above)  it wou'ld  be  desi ~able, or  even  nece~sar-y, fo  -su,bject 
0  •  •  •  0  0  •  - •  ~  I  L 
the  ~uffer ~ocking operations  with  a' view  to  avo~diri~-~nexpect~~ and 
/  - '  .  . 
undesirable  ~ffects  •. 
- --:.,  ..... 
. ·...::..,_  ..  '~-! • 
''" 
.  ' 
'· 
, ....  -- 7  -
Secondly,  it  wiL-L  be  seen  that, depending  on  the  circumstances, 
it f:Jight  be  desirable  to  be'  able' to  take action  to  immobillze 'or 
mobilize  sfocks  by  means  of  warrantage  oper~tions on  private or  public 
s~ock~, particularly  in  favour  ~f developing  country  producers~  ~ather· 
than  by· purchases  proper.  In  the  Commission's  opinion_,  i.f  the possibiLity 
were  provided·'f9r  operations of  this  type,  they shoulfl  be  treated as 
buffer  s~ock operations. 
With  this  one  exception·;  the  Community· should  remain  firm 
regard,ing .the_  principle that,.'purchases  and ·sales  carr._ied  out  by  the  .  · 
~ 
buffer  stock  mana~er ~ould have  to  be  carried out  on  a  cash  basis  ahd 
on  the official markets. 
Lastly, it should  be  added  that  the  copper  acquired  by  the  stock 
should  as  far  as.possi~Le be  divi~ed among  ~arehouses ~ituated close 
to the various  areas ·of  majot  consu~~tiona 
4.  Regulation  of exports 
From ·t_he  p:reparatory  work  on ,copper,it  can  be· cone luded  that  the 
·regulation  of-copp~~ ~roduction.would not  b~ direc~ly possible  in  the 
case _of  cer'tain  m~jor producers •. Moreover,  the  Commission  is:well · 
aware  that' recourse: to· export -regulation;  the· only  means  of.--achieving  .  . .  .  .  .  .  .  ' 
analogous_  results;  a l"so  would  -i  ~vi te objections  from  the viewpoint 
of  'the  market  econo~y.  The  experie.nce  of-the period ·1975-78,  when 
persistent  production  surpluses, _coinciding  with  a  generalized  economic 
depression,  kept. prices  at- abnormally  low  levels,  shows,  however~ that·· 
the  inertia 'of  the  ~roducti;n infrastructure is  su~h-that the .law of 
t·he  mark~t  canncit  rapidly  ensure  the· downward  adjustment  of  supply' -
'  '  .  .  ~ 
to  demand.  The  Commission  therefore  con~iders that  the possibility 
of  navirlg  temporary  recourseto  export  regulation.must  be  envisaged 
., 
in  the-agreement_ to  cope  a~  a  la~t  resort  ~ith circumstances  of  this· 
kind.  The·  use; of  such  measures  should  in  any- case -be  conditional  on 
a)  th~ exhaustion  of  the-buffer  itocking  resources; 
b)  a. negative  result  in  consultation.~ withi"n  the bodies· of the.· 
agree~erit  on  i  ~elf-imposed  and·~ndivfdual di.scipline  ~t the 
pibduction stage  ~o.b~~ng price~ to an  acceptable  Level; 
.1. 
;  ... ';-. 
I\'.  i' 
-\; 
,  c) .a  ~consensus· within- the  man~gi  ng  body  of. the. agreement  not  onLy  on  the 
'arra0gem~nts  fo~  export·r~g~lat~on but  also ·on ·th!  object~v~·of 
; ·:  marke-t  re:c_overy,. ~-~e.  on  the  d_esi red  price  ri,se •  ." 
Furtherm·ore,  the  c·omrriuriity  could"i"ldi cate· now  that  fn- i'ts  view;;.._ and . 
.  since  c~p~er fs ·traded~in four:· forms:- co~ce~tr.3'te-s-.and mattes; blister; 
•  •  ._  I 
~~fin.ed a-nd  'scrap  -,t_he  quo!a .f?r  any.  partitip~nt  ·;ho·~:J_ld  be·applied  to--. 
the  overal-L  coppe~ content· .of·· ·its  .exports,_ irrespective o( the, pr~~ucts 
.:..  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  ~ ' 
.  _.  .  - .  .  •  .  .  ..  '  I 
. exported._  Natura.lly,  it  would  also  b.e.  hecess_ary  to_._ envisage pr?vi si on.s 
to. prevent.participants  from  mi·sapplying  the ·quotas.by  exportin-g  semi-
•  '  •  .  .  •  ,  • ,  r  ,  •  .  •  . 
finfshed.produ~cts or  via  the.ir trade. with  non-partic.ipat:ingJcour:ltr"i_es. 
'  ......  ' 
U~de~  s~~h eonditions;  the·r~gulatio~of exporis  c6~ld be  ~ipected  . 
.  '  .  .  -- .  .  .  .  .  ... 
to  have  an  effeCtive _and  nece.ssa ry ·influe-nce  on prod!Jct ion- and  could  · 
.  -~voi.d  in  ~articular the. formation  of  la'rge-~ca  L~···and.  u~commi  tted  st~cks 
·by :tt-i~·producers,  _the  ver>:.  ~xistence pf  which-~ould.·in,the.  L()ng  run 
.weigh.heavil~-on  ~rites. 
.  . . 
LastLy  ;·and  in ·view ·of  the  fa_ct  that  the  mandate  of_  the  2nd  IGEC 
- ""~  .  .  '  .  .  .  - .  .  ......  . :  )  -__  ~-- .  .  .  .  .  . 
mentiorJS  them  explicitly,  a- _wor·a .could  be. said  here  on  the.  impli~atiOJ1S 
'  '  '  ,  ,.- .  I  • 
"of  the  stabi lizati~n rrieasores  concernir:ig  the  co,..p'roducts  of  coppe'r ·and 
.  .  ~  .  ._  .  .  ..  .  .  '  .. --.  .  .  .  .  y  -..  · 
. copper'  scrap~~  As- far  as  the  L(ltter "is  conc~rned,. the _-C6mmis'sion  does 
_·  _not  '.c~ns.iderthat  -c~~per~ scrap  poses~~y t;,ecial.probLe~ with ·.re·gard  · 
1
:-
-to·marke_t  s~apilizatiol),  e~cept ·that· it will'be hecessa.ryto  ~a~e it· 
into account  in the- event  of, export  regu.lati on,  as  stated· above.  In  - .  .  .  .  ,,  - .  .  .  .  . 
practic'·e,· scrap -and~ _·mo·re·  particularly,  ~ec.lairried  met~l- alre~dy pla'y 
·a  stabi~izing· ro.le;  s-ince.high"'·p.rfce·s  sti.mulat~·recove~ya_nd the 
mar~eti·ng of  scrap  and.  lbw  pri-ces  have ·the_oppo'sit·e ·effect. 
,?  •  ~  - •  •  •  •  .. 
As-regards  th~·riumerdus-:co- and_by-products  of  copP,er  metallurgy 
'·  _(cob~lt,_ ·nickel, :molybdenum,  zinc; -_gold',  .si"L'ver,  ..  etc.·)~ it,  i~ 
p~rrticularly'wh:en th'e  market  is depressed for-copper·;  possiply: ma.king. 
the  regulation:of  copper  produCtlOrl· inevitable, 'that·problerTJS .are  likely 
'  .  '  .  .  .  .  . . .  ~  .  .  '  .  .  . 
to··arise- because-,of .the  intera~tions b'etween  the  markets. in ·question~  .  - .  \  .  .  .  .  - - .  -~  '  -
The  question  also ariSes  ~-f  making  allowance_s  for.these'p_roduets ·in-'the 
l~ss.~s  in :ea rn.i ng~ -'-from  copper  expbrt~ :sust,ai  n~d by --~ert'a·; r)  deve_lopin~ 
~  '  .l  •  ... 
.countr-ies  if. such  lo~ses-·we'r.e. to  coristi tute ·a  cr.it~ri  on  for  the  .. 
.  . 
app l i cat i'bn·  of-'poss i b le  measures  spec"iffca ll/-concerni  ng ·t.hem ..  (see .. 
'  -. .  _..  .  ....  ~  '  .  _,  - ..  ·.  .- :  ' . . -.  ..  .  . 
5  above) •. 
r  . 
.'!. 
l. 
'  ·, - 9  -
-
.The  proi:Xems  .in question are,  however, too varied. in  importance 
..  . 
and  n<l:ture,. depending  on  t_he  co-product,> the  country  and  even  the.  ore 
deposits,  for it to·be possible at  this. stage to  say  whether  and  how 
~n arrangement  6n  copper  could·p~ovide a  solution. 
~- Pa.rticular  p~oblems of  the  developing  country producers 
· · Mi'neral  and  metal  pr.oduction  exposes ·operators to uncertainties 
that  are.normally the  result ·of.the market  economy.  The  Commission 
would  stress that  in the  case  ofdeveloping  countries  that  are 
. econo_m.ica'~ly vulnerable  and·  in additi·on· very  dependent. on  copper' 
C_notabty· ?ai re,  Zambia,  ChiLe,  Peru  and  Papua  New  Guinea)  these 
uncertainties  can  result  in an  economic  ~isaster·of  un~cceptable 
proportions  for  t~e countries  conc~rn~d and also,  because  of -~he· invest-
'ment  shortfalls  c~mulati~ely induced,  can  result  in .the  unexpected  and 
excessive  Ldss  of  pro~uction capacity that  by  its nature  should in no 
~ay be  considered  as  economically marginal. 
The  copper-consuming  industriali~ed cou8tries  cannot  remain 
/. 
·indifferent to  such  problems  an·d  corrective measures  must  be  adopted • 
. A first question on  this  subjeGt  ihv~L~es:discriminating between those 
-· 
corrective measur.es  to  be  i nt reduced ·in the .  copper  agreement .; tsel  f 
and  those  tha~  ~hould .be  included  among  development  aid  measures. 
·It  is  Logical  of  course. to  include  in the  agr_eement  on  copper 
corrective measures  to deal  with  the  effects of  the  mea.sures  provided 
for  in the  arrangement  it~el·f.  Th.i s  appl:i es  in particular  to the 
measures  ref~rred'to-~n 4  above:  measures .which refer to the 
.circumstances  where  the  developing c'ountry  producers  ~ould be  obliged 
to  simul~aneously put  a·  c~iting on  their exp9rts  and' receive  le~s 
re~unerative prices.  The  .Commissi6n  therefore  feels  that  with  copper 
st~bilization in view,  an·  examination  should be made  in  such  cases  of 
~  '  .  . 
the  ways  of. alleviating the  difficulties -faced  by  certain producer 
. deveLoping_ countr:-ies  in  honouring  their· commitments  under  the  agreement; 
where  such  difficulties are due  in  ~articular·to Losses  in earnings 
from  copper  exports.· 
.1 •. 
.  I' 
.l ,. 
~.  . 
'·  '· 
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:·I~  :is  dear:- morevover  th'at  the._problem  of  providing  compensation 
. ',·as. such 'for thi  d-~vel'~ping· c;untri-es'  losses· in· earn'ings. f~om  commod,it~ 
expor~s::.wi tt  ~onti  .. nue'  to be  studi e.d  both  ·~s. a  generaL  ·d~ve  Lopment  . 
•  t"  •  --:  -
problem  ahd·fn  connection  with  the ·balance  of  p;:~y~ent-s  pto_blem.  ·· 
,.  ' 
·rhe:prpblem  facing_ the  community-is  s'p_e~ial-,an9  delic~te  b~cause 
I  •'  ' 
cert~in of  ~t~  member~ c6n~idef-that th~.compen$~tion of the  d~velopi~g  .  .  - .  ' 
. .  ~ 
countries•.\osses  iri  commodity,  export  earnings  should  ... be.  consid~·re·d as  a 
so~~t~on  i~st~ad ~i ~o~modity·~greem~~ts-~nd particulariy,  i~ the  ~pe~~~i~ 
.  .  ·.  .  .  ..  . 
-~ase of  c_opper,  as  a  solution 'that  is preferab-Le  to  market ·stabHization 
measures.  ·,.  ·"  '.  ·  ..  ' 
,  I 
..  For.  -:the  Commission,  it is therefore .of the  utm.ost  :importance-."to 
rem-ove  an  obstacle  which  i.n  .its  ~iew·is  reaLLy·  rather artifiCial.  :The 
. - .  .  .  ~  -
,·  '  l 
Commission  would. recall  in-fact:·  . 
;  '  '  '  . 
a)  that  it·· is  no~ ·"ori"  P,()Lit.ical'ly, :to  propo~e ·the  ba.sing.  of  a  .copper 
agreement  on  export  ·earni~g.s  compens,ation  for  certain c;leveloping  " 
countri'es;,  ~-· 
'  . \· 
·'- . 
~  . 
b)  full  co~pensJtion could  ~fove much  more  costty.tha~ a  stabiljzation 
_·  agr.eemen~· a'nd  th.e  community,  the. Larges't .world  consum.er  importing·  .-. 
.  ~  '  .  •  1_.:  -
copper _rriainl'/ fr.om  ·th·e  developing' countries  that 'ar'e  most- di rect.ly  ; 
c'oncer~ed;. mig_ht_  find  'it.·d.if·f1c~lt  to  av~id making..;a  .very  costly 
'i 
. GOnt ,::; but_; on;  . ,  .. 
I  -·-· 
.c)  f~· i.s  cleat that  the  Comm.unity.'will  already  be  making  a  ..  c-onsiderab\e 
ef'fort._ in- favour ·.of  certa1 n  of  the  deve:Lopi ng  count ri e.s ·.inos·t. directly 
con~ern'ed.· in .the  context  of the new  ACP-EEC  ·Convention;. 
.  .  . '  ....  -..  '  . 
.  ''}. 
_d~_the  Co~munity_is  iJ!  anx·  even·t.alr:-eady  ir:1y9Lved  in  the  discussi6-ns  " 
:  .  .  ' 
concerning  "horizontal"  solutions  to this  prpblem  in  the  IMF~  UNCTAD,; 
-etc.;, 
e)  as  far  as 
.  .  ' 
the  concept  of· the. syste~  ·iS. c.on'cerned;,. _.COr(lpen$at i_on  for 
loss;es  in export-earnings ;cannot 'rema·i·n ·  wi -i:'hi n  acceptabl~  limit~ 
.  •  ~  '  .,  f  .  . 
unless: 
.  .  . 
it applies  to a  group  of  products;  -· 
t,be  markets. of .the  rri_a.in  ~ommodit.ies,  inclu'din-g  copper,.-~are 
suit~bly  ~tabi.L1zed-n  ~'- · 
• I·-
II. 
\ .. .J 
11  -
Th~  Commis~i6n theref6re  hope~ that  the  Co~munity'will be  able to 
agree to ·; tS  propos at  and  declare  itself in  favour eOf  th·e  pd  nc iple of 
·adjustm~nts to the  stabilization measures- to be  written  into ~ny 
agreement- in  favour- of  the·most  vul"nerable  developing  countries •.  lt 
should be  prepared  to study  such  ~djustments-without  p~'juduce and  leave  .  ....  .  ' 
aside,_  as  regards .a  copper  agreement,  the question  of_  compensation 
proper  for  losses  of  expOrt  earnings  from  copper  • 
.  6~ .dbject~~e of  and  arrangements  for  international consultatioris, 
'  i n~ti  tutiona l  aspects 
In  the  Commission •-s  view;,  the  success ·of  an· .agreement  Qn  copper; wl'll 
~e dependent  to:a  very  grea~  ~xtent on  a  special  e~f6rt  to~: -
·- admjnister the  measur~s  ~hile paying  close· attention to the  develop~ent 
of  th~ situation ·in .the  c~pper sector; 
takeinto  ac~ount the  practic~l experience  and·problems  of  industrial 
·,  ' 
and  commercial  operators; 
ensu~e ~rani~are~cy, particularly as  regards:  the  technologic~l, 
'  economic.and  financial  aspects  of  production  and  consumption;  the 
.futures markets;  t~e  ~nte~national trade  and  the prices aciually 
•  '  '  '  <  •  •,  • 
appli~d; the  f~reseeable trend  of  such  data; 
- clarify and  ~ncourage the  consistenc~ of  the policies ~f the 
participants  in the  agreement  with  the objectiv'es of that  agreement; 
- -
~ake it possible to define,  with  a  view  to the  development·of  subsequent 
international action,  the  most  s~itable measures  for  market 
.  .  .  . 
·stabilization and ·more  generally"fo~ an ·improvement  in the  functioning 
·of  the  copper  se.ctor  in the  medium  and  Long-term. 
't 
Given  the  interaction in all these fields the  Community  will 
t.herefore  need- to insi.st  very fi rnil'y  that  the  i.nstitutional  structure 
o_f  the  agreement  make  i-t. poss1ble "tor close and  effective  consu1.1ations 
to  be. het'd  betwe_en  the participa-nts.  The  Community  witl  therefore pay: 
< 
p~rticular attention to the  powers  of  the  governing  body  in the various 
-areas  covered  by  t.he  agreement,· to tne decision-making process,  an~ to. 
the  Cinkage- and  import'ance  of  t'he  technical  resources  given to the 
agreement. 
.  ;  .1 • .  ~- '. 
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Among  th~se  resource~  the  a~reem~nt must  establish  a  monitori~g 
'  '  ~  '  -:-.:  •  '  •  - '  1  - ' 
service to  ensur.e.~ the- c:ol_lecti on, .e Laboraticin,  and,  unqer  the .  . , . 
. responsibHity'o·f.the  ma~aging·b;dy o'f  th~  ag'reem~_~t,-th_e: circulation 
•  1  •  •  - - •  ,l  ••  - •  •  ·- '  •  • 
of the-.; riforina.tion  to  en.sure  .. the  desired· tr<mspar:e:hcy; · :....rhe'  obli gati'ons 
.  -·  -·  .  .  ..  .  .  - '  :\.:  . ... :  '  .  ·_.  '  .....  .  .  .  . 
_of-the  particfpan~s relating to-the  communication  of the  necessary 
'  .  . - .. '  .  -
data  ~~st be  set out  expli6itly  iM  ~~y ag~eement. 
The  previous·exami.nation of.the measures .to  be  er:l\li.sag_ed_shows 
''that it wc)uld  be  necessary  as·  a  ma,tt'er  of  priority'to  dire~t  the, studies 
l  ...  ~  """'  •  •  - •  •  '  ' 
.and consultations_ towards  certain  subje.cts •. In  the  Corrim)ission's  view·:  .  .  .  -~  .  '  . 
th~se Would  ~nclude  ;~~~articular: 
:  .  .  .  ~....  '  . 
...  an  analysis of  ina:rket  _phenome~a; pirticularly  ~he  ..  -c~ntan.go-,.backwardation  . 
· ·  , .  move~ent :and  it~  signH·i·c,aiTc~  .in  r.el'ati~n.·to". the  eva:luat.ioh  of  the  ·. 
I  •  '  '  :'  •  '·  . 
. L6n~-te~m pri~e  ~rend; 
--,the'  r~latjonship  "betwee·n~ the  pri~ce  trend  ana. the  trend  _~ot 'factors 
'd.eterini~ing  produc'ti'on·_costs,  p_artic,ularly  i-n  the  light' of  technolo.gi_cal· 
:developments; 
.  I 
the. r'e la7i'onshi_p  bet_wee~ 'the  width of 'a  price· :_range<and:·.t.he  ne~·essa  ry 
·  buff~r-'stoc~ resources;·. 
· ·  _-.... :possible  i  ~teract.i  oris·  b~tween·  ·co-mmerci-a~  stocks, 'technical  stocks, 
',_ 
-.·the  foreseeab-l~. trend·· of  P,'i·oduction  and COI)Sumption  capa~ity. ' 
.~ 
.. ·  ·  The  number  and  importance  of  these  topics, ,more  dehi Led  knowledge, . 
_, 
of  wh,i ch ·constitutes  a  pre~condj ti  on  f_or  th"e  'effective management' of  the, 
.  . .  - ' 
agreement _and  indeed  for  an·y. improvement  of  the  m~asu~es -i~  subs.equerit_. 
~g~eeme~ts~  ~lso shows  t~at_the  Com~~n~ty will  need~ to pay  ~articu~ar  . -
atteritfon  t'o  .the  determination of the 'durati<?n·_::-of·  the  ~gteement and. 
\:  ..  ·  - .  .  ''  .  '  .  '  .  .  .  ' 
··to t_he  conditions  g·ove~ning. i_ts  renegot~·a_tfon or adaptation.  .If  an·:. 
agreement  of  five  years  '<o~r·more)  were  pr'opo~ed,  eit'h,er  there  would 
·  ~eed --~-<?  b~·_provi~·ions. enablir~g  i_ts_managing·bodrto adjust  t~e_  · 
measur,esi·n· a'ccordance  with  Circumsta~ces  o·r_~lse there_ would- "need .to 
provision  for  'th~ .pos~ibi t.ity of .:mid~term  renegotiati_on. 
. '.. !-• 
.  ·.· 
be_. 
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On  tbis tatter  po~nt_  it must  be ~tressed~ in the  Commission
1s  vie~~ 
that  unless ·an  eff·ort· is mad-e  to  a-chieve  a  bette-r  regulation -of  investment 
·and  of  product-ion  capa.ci t·y  in  the  Light  of  known  and  foreseeable.· 
requ:i r_eme.nt s,,  the  stabilization measures  provided  for  in any  ag'reement  _· 
.are {n  dange.r  of  frequently_ and  perhaps. permanently being insufficient 
to ·meet  t~e needs  of  the  moment~  ~ne of·the main  merii.s of  the 
.  . 
consultations  pu.rsued  in ·the  cont~xt  of  an _agreem.ent  on- ~opper .would 
therefore  be  to promote  a  self-1mposed _and  individual  discipline' as 
.  . 
-regards  investment  and -capacity. 
ln  conclusion, 'it  s·houl:d  be  recalled' that .'experience  has  shown·. 
that it wi:L L be  in the. Commu-nity's  interest to ensure _the·  best  means 
·- ' 
-of.  being  able  to exer-cise  effective control  over.  the  acti·on  car·rjed  out 
in  the  context  of. the  agreement,  particular-ly  regarding  t.he  basi-s  o:f 
the  voting  rights 1o  :be  allocate.d  t·o  the  Community  and  i·ts  i.ntrinsic 
participadcin  in  the  agreement~·  From_  this viewpoint,  the :Commission  -
--would  recall_ its position on  the  form  of the  Community's  participation i:n, 
commodity  ·a~reements,  a  pqsi ti_on  o~- which, the  Court· of Justice  was. ask~d 
·.for an  opinion. regarding  the· negotiation of  the agreement  :on  natural 
rubber.· 
8.  Financial  -requirements 
The  requirement~ can be  ~onsidered undef three  headfn~s: 
(, .)  M  f  'h  u  - . 
.;.~!!~9~!!!~D!...;2  __  :L~-~·gr:~~!!!~!!! 
··  ·The  scale of .the· annual  eXI)enses ·mi_ght  reasonaply .be as  follows:_ 
Secretariat of  the agreement , 
Copper :monitoring  service  . 
Manageme.nt  of  the bu:ffer  st-ock  and:.of 
possible  expd~t  regulation ~measure's  . '· 
Meetings  ~f. the  org~ns 6f-the agreement 
mio  ,ecu 
. - 0.25  .  '. 
0.5 
0.?5 
1.00 
2.0 
A-five-year ·agr·eement  .would  therefore  cost  1.0.  million -ECU. 
(; i)  -~~ff~~-~!2£!5.  <First  Windo.w  of  the  ;Common  Fund) 
. The  buffer  stock  is  not~ it should  be  r-emembered,  lost  expendi~'ure 1 
but  rathe.r  investment  t-o  be  made  in  stage~,' even if  such  stages  and 
.1. .( 
;• 
·:,  .. 
/ 
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the  corresponding  volume  are  not  foresseable  in detaiL  at  the  outse_to  ·At 
this-st-age it 1s ·6nly  po~s-ible.~o say that -500000 tormes  of  copper  C!t  a 
price _of  probably Jes_s  than-·z  000  EOU  per  to~ne wduld  invo-lve- at  the 
.  .  . '  ~  . 
<very  m~ximl.l~  an-inv,estmen_~ figure  of  1  000  m-illiOn.  EC_~. 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  ..  ·  . 
Al.l  operations.ef.fecti~g stocks  arid  the-availa:bi-'Lity<of-the;product  and·  .  .  .  .  . 
theref9(~_ the_  supply  (warr~-F}fag_e,- possi  ~  l-e. fi nand al  Cli ds  to  t~e /copper 
sector  fn' 'certai-n  deve toping·· countries  and  ~nde~ .certain con_di ti  on,s  ~  se_e 
. S)-should ,be·  brough~-:--Of!der  buf:fe'r  stock~ng· and- be-capable  of  being- . 
. .  ,'  '. 
C  iii> ··Othe~- mea su.res:  . CSec·ond- Wi·ndow  of- the :·co·inmon  Fund> 
.  .  .  I 
.  .  .  •  ·: .·  f.  .  ..  -
:Without· excluding  the possibility of  copper .benefiting  from-:a_ctiv1ties 
.  -in  technolog~cal -re:searc.h, .trade, promot-1on,  etc.,  -it--i~  unli:ke'Ly  tl}at.: 
.stress-~ilL be  Laid6~ this  ~ype"of  action~  It  ~o-ul'd  neverthel~ss:be 
·.  r~asonab  le. to- m~ke provision,  unde~ this_' category  of.  mea'su'res~ -f~r  ~he 
resour~es ,ne~de~ tocarry_-out .spec-ial_stu(jies~_on the  copper-: in-dustry:: 
and  tra_~~  am9unting  for  example·'to  -a~. annua'L·  ;figc.~re_ of.  aro.und  0.5 
mil l.i on~  ECU.- · 
.  ;..  . 
,9.  Financing. 
::There  ar~ two ,.th~or~eti cal ly  oppos.ed_  methdds-of  fi'narici n9-:  that 
·of  L~vies on  i.nternat]onal trade ·and.  tha-t ·of  national,  contributio_ns.·~· 
The  advantage.'-of the first _method  .is  its relatively -~imple ·natu~_e  -~nd ·the 
:fadt' that -it.  ni~kes  i.t  P.~ssi.ble .to, avoid ·th'e· budg~tary  proble~s  r-ela~ing .. 
[ .  . .  .  .  ·~  .  . .  .  .  . .  ·•  .  .  .  .  \  ' 
to' n~tiona~  contributions·~  l:lowever,  this method  giyes' rise .to.two-
critiCisms: 
.  I,  . 
... 
.  •1  ~  I  ,  ·' ~ 
i>·It\ign6~es  _th~  US~-whp~e influence  o~ the  copper  m~rket· at  wo~ld 
.  ·- .  .  .  .  - ""'  .... 
Level ·greatLy_ excee9s ·the· extent <of .its 'i nvoLv:ement.  i~  i nternati  ona'l-- -.· 
trao~~ .·. · 
.  .  .  ' 
-·b>  This  method  is ope·o  to questi6n  asregar.C:ls  its.allocat·ion -difficult·.· 
. \.  to evaluate  in  objecti'v~ 'te'rms  .;. -of:  the fi  nan~i  a l; bu~deq b'etw'een  ·  . 
·_...  •  p  '  •  , 
consu~e;s  ~nd  p~6~u~e~s.~  Produ~et~'insist  ~ith  ~ome·~~uth;ihat in. 
'  - .  (  .  .  - .  -
a  depressed  mar.ket  the .Leyies  wo~:ld_ amount  fo  ari· equivalent 
. reduction .in-t~eir  earntngs~. 
,1  -· 
"•  "'. 
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In: any· event,  the  prospect  of  the  forthcoming  establishment  of  the 
Common  Fund 'wi ll.doubtless  tend' to  exert  an  influ.ence  iri favour· of  .  '  '  '  .  .  .  . 
national ·contributions.  On  this  assumption~ any  agreement  on  copper 
would·accede  almos~  inevitably t6 the  Common  Fund.  Thts  w6uld  m~an, 
in  so  far  as  ca~ be  fore~een at  present,  the  initial  pay~ent to  the. 
Fund  of  6ne-third of the  maximum  amount  envisaged  for  the  financing  of the.·· 
buff~r stock,  ~~:333 miL(io~ ECU  as  a  rou~h  est~mate  • 
. · .. The.  in~tial contribution of  the  Community,  assuming  equal· 
.  . 
participation 9f producers· and  consumers,  ~oul~ therefore  a~ount to  some 
45-55  million  ECU.  The  obligations of.the  Community,  un~er the 
·i'lgreem.ent;  would  involve  complementary  financing  amounting  to  some 
.90-110  million- ecu.: ·  . 
'The  Commun.ity  partic_ipation  in the  cur.rent  expenditure of  t'he 
agreem~nt·- some  0.45~0.55 million.Ecu· an~uatly ~:whatev~~ the  met~2d 
.of  financing .$hould  not  of  course  pose  anY.  particular P,roblems. 
I,  '1 
.; 
,,;_I' 